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Introduction 
In [1] three principal themes are identified by the UK MoD (Ministry of Defence) in order 
to  deliver  the  vision  of  NEC  (Network  Enabled  Capability):  Networks,  People  and 
Information.  It is the security of information, which is discussed in this article.  The drive 
towards NEC is due to many factors; one defining factor is to provide an increase in 
operational tempo in effect placing one ahead of their enemy in terms of acting within 
their OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop.  However as technical and procedural 
systems are being advanced to achieve the vision of NEC, what impact does this have 
on the traditional information security triangle, of preserving the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information?  And how does this influence current security engineering 
and accreditation practices, particularly in light of the proliferation problem?  This article 
describes research conducted into answering these questions, building upon the findings 
of  the  NITEworks®  [2]  ISTAR  (Intelligence,  Surveillance,  Target  Acquisition  and 
Reconnaissance) Theme studies and focusing on a tactical battlefield scenario.  This 
scenario relates to the IFPA (Indirect Fire Precision Attack) [3] project where the efficient 
synchronisation  of  potentially  numerous  sources  of  information  is  required,  providing 
real-time decisions and delivery of effects, in accordance with the requirements of NEC.  
It is envisaged that the IFPA systems will consist of numerous sub-systems each of 
which will provide a unique effecting capability to the UK army with differing levels of 
speed, accuracy and range.        
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The underlying theme of NEC is to provide the UK military organisation with decision 
superiority  through  information  superiority.    A  vital  tenet  of  information  superiority  is 
information sharing.  According to [1] information sharing in the NEC sense implies rapid 
& simultaneous information transfer through automated processes.  All four of these 
pillars are inherently reliant upon information security as illustrated in figure 1.  Many 
current and future military CIS (Communication & Information System) developments are 
driven by the pillars of NEC.  It is envisaged that if fulfilled these pillars will provide agile 
and  dynamic  business  processes,  based  upon  an  efficient  and  effective  electronic 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 1: Fundamental building blocks required to achieve NEC. 
 
From  an  information  security  point-of-view  network  enabled  systems  still  require  the 
confidentiality  and  integrity  of  information  to  be  preserved.    The  third  dimension  of 
availability  is  a  broad  requirement,  which  has  traditionally  related  to  robustness 
(operational  continuity  or  graceful  degradation).    However  from  an  NEC  and  tactical 
battlefield point-of-view it is argued that availability necessitates timeliness on a par with 
robustness,  where  timeliness  implies  that  all  relevant  information  is  delivered  to 
authorised entities at the correct time enabling efficient information sharing. 
 
Proliferation Problem  
There is currently a significant increase in the utilisation of COTS (Commercial Off The 
Shelf) products in military CIS; this is evident in a number of projects [3, 4].  As well as 
this the requirement for high-levels of interoperability with foreign nation systems, along 
with the need to adhere to the security principle of least-privileges (or need-to-know), 
has lead to increased fragmentation
1 of the military CIS.  In this context this is called the 
proliferation  problem,  where  vulnerable  connections  are  no  longer  confined  to 
communications interfaces between multi-level classification systems.  This is illustrated 
in figure’s 2 and 3, where it can be seen that the risks to security have traditionally 
                                                 
1 Due to the varying degrees of trust one may have in such systems.   related  to  inter-classification  communications,  however  the  problem  domain  has  now 
augmented to an intra-classification level as well. 
 
 
Figure 2: The traditional security issue of interfacing at the inter-classification 
level. 
 
 
Figure 3: The new security issue of interfacing at the intra as well as inter-classification 
level. 
 
Partitioned Infrastructures 
It is currently standard practise to satisfy all high-risk connections whether inter or intra-
classification with a partitioned infrastructure (or air-gap) solution, their attractiveness is 
their provably simple and inexpensive approach towards managing risks and therefore 
gaining  security  accreditation.    Air-gaps  however  impose  severe  restrictions  on 
operational efficiency, therefore impacting upon the information security requirement for 
timeliness.  Limitations imposed by air-gap solutions such as manual medium transfer 
and re-typing include: 
 
￿  Allow for only primitive data transfers 
￿  Error prone due to human deficiencies 
￿  Constrain rapid C2 (Command & Control) requirements     
 
Significant advances in providing efficient alternatives to air-gaps have been made ever 
since  the  requirement  for  MLS  (Multi-Level  Security)  was  formally  identified  in  the 
orange  book  [5].    However,  the  overheads  of  implementing  and  maintaining  such 
systems primarily for the military, in accordance with common criteria requirements has proved to be very expensive for such a niche market.  This has lead to the continuation 
in use of partitioned infrastructures. 
 
If all high-risk connections utilise partitioned infrastructures then in combination with the 
proliferation problem this will prohibit the information security requirement for timeliness, 
effectively disabling the vision of true NEC.  This is illustrated in figure 4, where it is 
shown that numerous air-gaps may be utilised to separate systems and subsequently 
sub-systems for the reasons described previously.  In [6] an experiment was carried out 
where  it  was  shown  that  manual  information  transfer  introduces  administrative 
overheads into the kill chain (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage & Assess) from an air 
force point-of-view. 
 
Figure 4: Generic high-level overview of potential configuration of future military 
systems. 
 
Inefficiencies in the kill chain would limit the ability of systems such as IFPA to engage 
high  value  TSTs  (Time  Sensitive  Target),  which  is  a  fundamental  operational 
requirement.  This is exemplified in the current conflict in Iraq, where it can be seen that 
enemy targets are no longer in the form of large relatively static forces such as the Red 
Army or Republican Guard.  Instead highly dynamic and agile terrorist cells are a new 
kind of enemy, the invisible enemy who if located must be rapidly engaged for maximum 
effect.  However this requires minimal latency from the moment that a potential target 
has first been identified to all other stages in the kill chain. 
 
Previous  drives  towards  reducing  the  total  time  of  the  kill  chain  have  focused 
considerably on processes and technologies, for the efficient commitment and delivery 
of  munitions.    These  include  all  weather  and  precision  guided  munitions  as  well  as 
integrated  sensing  &  effecting  capabilities.    Such  developments  have  significantly 
reduced  the  launch  and  flight  times  of  munitions.    However,  in  order  to  realise  the 
potential  of  such  information  intensive  enhancements  it  is  important  to  remove  any 
unnecessary  steps  in  the  information  flow  and  decision  chain  as  alluded  to  in  [7].  
Partitioned infrastructures are such an unnecessary step, particularly in future battlefield 
systems, which require increased information processing and sharing for BDA (Battle 
Damage Assessment) and SA (Shared Awareness) purposes. Non-Partitioned Infrastructures 
NITEworks® carried out two sequential programmes of work within the ISTAR Theme.  
The NITEworks® ISTAR Theme, Phase 1 study [8] which addressed the UK Information 
Requirement  Management  processes,  demonstrated  significant  benefits  to  NEC  of 
automated information transfer in the form of non-partitioned infrastructures.  Principal 
improvements  were  identified  in  information  sharing  and  therefore  shared  situational 
awareness.    In  relation  to  information  security,  these  improvements  can  be  seen  to 
enhance the requirement for timeliness.  However, confidentiality & integrity were not 
considered  in  this  phase  in  order  to  highlight  the  deficiencies  of  non-partitioned 
infrastructures from an information security point-of-view.   
  
It  is  suggested  that  the  security  of  partitioned  and  the  operational  efficiency  of  non-
partitioned  infrastructures  are  required  in  combination,  giving  logically  partitioned 
infrastructures.    Logically  partitioned  infrastructures  would  therefore,  increase  the 
chances of successful security accreditation and enable true NEC through automated 
information  transfer.    This  was  also  established  in  the  NITEworks®  ISTAR  Theme, 
Phase 2 study [9] which addressed UK Collection Co-ordination issues whilst utilising a 
US-provided planning tool which would be used in a US-led US-UK coalition, supporting 
expeditionary  operations.    The  core  of this work  was  the  identification  of  a  security 
architecture that permitted a high level of data flow enabling the effective transfer of 
ISTAR information between UK/US and US/UK; as a result demonstrating the ability to 
achieve  enhancements  in  timeliness,  whilst  implementing  strict  security  controls  to 
preserve the confidentiality and integrity of information. 
 
Logically Partitioned Infrastructures 
From figure 5 it can be seen that as information filters down the command chain, from 
highly  complex  strategic  aims  (high-level  government  policy  directives)  down  to  low-
complexity  actions  (i.e.  precise  military  orders  e.g.  formatted  messages),  the 
requirement for  timeliness  increases, moreover  the  resolution  of the  information  also 
increases, resulting in well-defined and unambiguous commands.  The tactical battlefield 
can be seen to be at the actions level in the command chain.  From this it is argued that 
although the combination of communications in time-critical tactical battlefield scenarios 
such  as  IFPA  are  numerous;  such  exchanges  exhibit  sufficient  precision  and 
redundancy  for  pre-definition  according  to  well-defined  sets.    These  communications 
may then be securely executed in the form of automated M2M (Machine-to-Machine) 
communications removing the overheads associated with manual information transfer. 
This  is  in-line  with  contemporary  risk  management  thinking,  which  proposes  the 
limitation of processes
2 to only operate on data, for which the interpretation is bounded. 
 
                                                 
2 A process in this context does not strictly relate to a software process, instead relating 
to any abstract computing capability operating on information in any way. 
  
Figure 5: Illustration of the complexity of information in the command chain. 
 
Research has been conducted into potential solutions for achieving logically partitioned 
infrastructures through automated information transfer processes as described in [1].  A 
method known as intra-system message filtering has been proposed which uses XML 
(Extensible  Markup  Language)  as  the  messaging  format.    The  main  advantage  of 
utilising an XML based solution is due to the schema definition functionality provided in 
the  XML  standard.    This  allows  for  an  off  the  shelf  solution  for  the  pre-definition, 
classification and validation of messages.  Systems may only receive data for which they 
have the necessary need-to-know (privilege).  This can be seen to be analogous to the 
traditional computer security subject-privilege-object model.  In which users are subjects 
who have an associated set of privileges (read, write etc.) over objects such as files, the  
user in this sense can be replaced by machines; the privilege relates to a machines' 
need-to-know  with  regards  a  particular  object, which  is  the  communication.   Another 
major driver for using an XML based solution for electronic communications particularly 
M2M is due to its requirement as stated in [10], where XML is mandated as a non-
tradable standard for data exchange, between UK MoD systems. 
 
A high-level view of the architecture for intra-system message filtering is given in figure 
6, where it can be seen that a trusted interface converts messages from proprietary 
formats to XML, individual system owners such as IFPA would need to define authorised 
communications  for  distinct  sub-systems,  using  XML  schemas.    The  trusted  filter 
mechanism  will  be  used  to  enforce  restrictions  on  communications  between  sub-
systems based upon the pre-defined schemas.   
 
From an information security point-of-view the intra-system message filtering capability 
will preserve the confidentiality and integrity of information by ensuring only authorised 
information is communicated by all sub-systems.  By removing the human in the loop for 
the actual transfer of data from one machine to another the issue of timeliness is also 
addressed, whilst removing the inaccuracies inevitably introduced by a human operator 
particularly  under  stressful  conditions.    Such  an  approach  would  limit  potential 
bottlenecks in information flow due to air-gaps, allowing secure and rapid transfer of information through automated processes.  Another potential advantage of this method 
is that current systems using infrastructures such as BOWMAN, would not have to adapt 
their  network  interfaces  or  messaging  formats  in  any  way  if  they  do  not  require 
segregation. 
 
 
Figure 6: High-level overview of intra-system message filtering. 
 
 
Summary 
The traditional information security triangle has evolved with increased emphasis on the 
aspect  of  timeliness.    This  is  reflected  in  the  UK  MoD’s  request  in  [1]  for  rapid 
information transfer through automated processes.  The proliferation problem highlights 
how  current  security  engineering  and  accreditation  practices  do  not  cater  for  these 
changing requirements. 
 
Although  the  focus  in  this  article  has  been  on  the  immediate  challenge  of  a  tactical 
battlefield scenario it is argued that, as military CIS become more network enabled, the 
proliferation  problem  will  become  increasingly  prevalent  in  other  scenarios  as 
demonstrated in the NITEworks® ISTAR Theme studies.  If alternative solutions to the 
current cautious approach of partitioned infrastructures are not sought, then it is likely 
that security accreditation requirements will prove a major stumbling block in allowing 
the military of not just doing things better but doing better things, which according to 
the MoD [1] is necessary to realise the potential of NEC.  Intra-system message filtering, 
which  is  a  method  for  achieving  secure  and  automated  information  transfer  (logical 
infrastructure  partitioning)  has  briefly  been  described  as  a  way  of  overcoming  the 
proliferation problem.  Intra-system message filtering is the subject of on-going research 
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